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To deal with the crisis, Jackson advocated a reduction in tariff rates. “The union shall be preserved,” he declared in 1830. He and others, including former President Madison, argued that Article 1, Section 8 of the Constitution gave Congress the power to “lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises.” Jackson pledged to protect the Union against those who would try to tear it apart over the tariff issue.
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President Jackson did not make the repeal of the 1828 tariff a priority and denied the nullifiers’ arguments. Other southern states backed away from what they saw as the extremism behind the idea.
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On the issue of nullification, South Carolina stood alone. James Hamilton, who served as governor of South Carolina in the early 1830s, denounced the “despotic majority that oppresses us.” Nullification also raised the specter of secession aggrieved states at the mercy of an aggressive majority would be forced to leave the Union. The theory of nullification, or the voiding of unwelcome federal laws, provided wealthy slaveholders, who were a minority in the United States, with an argument for resisting the national government if it acted contrary to their interests. Some southerners feared the federal government would next take additional action against the South, including the abolition of slavery. Resentment of the tariff was linked directly to the issue of slavery, because the tariff demonstrated the use of federal power. While production of cotton had soared during this time and this increase contributed to the decline in prices, many southerners blamed their economic problems squarely on the tariff for raising the prices they had to pay for imported goods while their own income shrank. By 1831, it had sunk to eight cents per pound. In 1818, cotton had been thirty-one cents per pound. By the early 1830s, the battle over the tariff took on new urgency as the price of cotton continued to fall. The Tariff of 1828 had driven Vice President Calhoun to pen his “South Carolina Exposition and Protest,” in which he argued that if a national majority acted against the interest of a regional minority, then individual states could void-or nullify-federal law. Another undercurrent was the resentment and anger of the majority against symbols of elite privilege, especially powerful financial institutions like the Second Bank of the United States. These southerners saw themselves as an embattled minority and claimed the right of states to nullify federal laws that appeared to threaten state sovereignty. The crisis over the Tariff of 1828 continued into the 1830s and highlighted one of the currents of democracy in the Age of Jackson: namely, that many southerners believed a democratic majority could be harmful to their interests. Discuss the origins and creation of the Whig Party.Explain the factors that contributed to the Nullification Crisis.Operation Husky highlighted the impediments of indecisive leadership, vague political guidance, inter- and intra-service rivalry, and an only partially filled role of an operational artist.By the end of this section, you will be able to: Nevertheless, poor synchronization and less prioritized logistical and intelligence aspects had a negative influence. Furthermore, it emphasized the adaptability of the German Wehrmacht utilizing their leadership philosophy to adapt quickly to emerging challenges. Operation Mercury was a reflection of German operational skills and their art of operations that highlights the relation to cognitive efforts and the intent. The use of the lenses revealed that both armies utilized a constrained application and rarely exploited the potential of their art of operations. The German Wehrmacht and the US Army applied similar characteristics and principles without having a cohesive doctrinal understanding. This monograph argues for a comparability of the contemporary and the current concepts of operational art.
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Although both operations were successful, they achieved their objectives at high costs and faced significant impediments. This enables the utilization of three lenses intent, synchronization, and risk to evaluate the application of an art of operations during the Operations Mercury 1941 and Husky 1943. By comparing the doctrinal frameworks, this monograph raises the initial research questions about a comparable doctrinal perception to todays sophisticated understanding. The German Wehrmacht and the US Army as part of the Allies applied their contemporary art of operations in the complex testbed of World War II successfully. According to current United States US Army doctrine, operational art fulfills a bridging role to pursue strategic objectives throughout the arrangement of tactical action in time, space, and purpose.